Guide · Choosing a vault

How do photo vault apps work? Keys, encryption and passcodes

A photo vault app copies a photo into its own storage, scrambles it with a key, and puts a passcode in front of the app. How safe it is depends on three things: where the key is kept, whether the passcode is the key or only a gate, and where the backup goes. Some vault apps only lock a screen and leave the files readable, so find out which kind you have.

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The three parts: a store, a key and a gate

Every photo vault app is built from the same three pieces, whatever its icon looks like.

  1. A store. A folder inside the app where the copies of your photos live. Other apps can’t read it, and your Photos library doesn’t list it.
  2. A key. A long random number that turns each photo into scrambled bytes and back. Without the key, the bytes in the store are noise.
  3. A gate. The code, pattern or face check you see when you open the app. It decides who the app lets in.

A vault that has only the store and the gate is a lock on a screen. The photos sit in the folder as ordinary image files. A vault that has all three keeps the files scrambled even if someone copies the folder. The checks in Are photo vault apps safe? help you tell the two apart.

What happens when you add a photo

In a vault of the full kind, adding a photo goes like this, whichever app you use.

  1. You choose the photos. The app gets a copy through iOS’s photo picker, and the original stays in your library.
  2. The app makes a fresh random key for that one file, so no two files share a key.
  3. It scrambles the copy with that key, using a standard cipher, and writes only the scrambled bytes to its store.
  4. It locks the file’s key with a master key, the vault key, and stores the locked file key with the file.
  5. It builds a small preview for the grid, and a careful vault scrambles that too. A preview left in the clear is a small photo anyone can read.

In Sealed, steps 2 to 5 are these: Each file gets its own random 256-bit key, and that key is sealed with your vault key. Sealed encrypts every file with AES-256-GCM before it is saved. Thumbnails are encrypted like the photos, and Sealed wipes the decrypted copies it shows in the grid when the vault locks.

The cipher is covered on how AES works in a vault.

Where the key lives

The key is the whole game. If it sits in a plain file next to the photos, encryption adds little. If it sits somewhere the phone guards, it adds a lot.

Your vault key is kept in the iPhone Keychain, on this device only, and it can be read only while the phone is unlocked. Your vault key is a random 256-bit key. It is not made from your passcode. Apple says keychain items in a class marked “This device only” are protected with the device’s own key when they are copied during a backup, which makes them useless if they are restored to a different device.

There is a flip side to a key the phone guards. Without Maximum Security, the app can read your vault key whenever the phone is unlocked, because the key sits in the Keychain. So the phone’s own passcode, and keeping the phone up to date, still matter.

That last point has a cost. A key that never leaves the phone can’t follow you to a new one by itself. That is why a vault built this way gives you a written copy of the key. The page What a recovery key is explains it.

Some vaults go one step further and tie the key to a face match, so an unlocked phone is not enough. Maximum Security seals your vault key to a Secure Enclave key that can be used only after a live Face ID or Touch ID match. Apple describes the Secure Enclave as a dedicated secure subsystem, isolated from the main processor, designed to keep sensitive user data secure even when the Application Processor kernel becomes compromised.

Why the passcode is not the key

A passcode of six digits has only a million values. Sealed’s default passcode is 6 digits, and you can choose 4 or 9 digits or a password instead. If a vault built its key from that passcode, a person with a copy of the files could try every value on a computer, fast, with no lock screen to slow them down.

Building the key from random numbers avoids that. Your passcode is a gate in front of the app. It is not part of the key. Your backup is sealed with your random vault key, not with your passcode, so a short passcode doesn’t make the backup easier to open.

The passcode still matters. It is what stands between the vault and a person holding your unlocked phone. That is why good vaults slow down guessing. By default, after three wrong passcodes in a row Sealed locks entry for 30 seconds, then for 1, 5, 15 and finally 60 minutes after each further wrong try. The numbers are on How long would it take to guess a passcode?.

What a backup changes

A backup is a second copy, so it needs the same care as the first. Ask two things: where does it go, and is it encrypted before it leaves the phone?

Backup goes to your own iCloud account, not to a server of ours. Files, names, notes and record fields are encrypted on your iPhone before they are uploaded, so iCloud receives only ciphertext. Backup records have plain types such as VaultItem and SecureNote and random identifiers, so iCloud can see that a backup exists and roughly how many records it holds.

To open that copy on a new phone, the key has to come from somewhere. The recovery key is the only way to decrypt an iCloud backup on a new iPhone. The backup guide has the questions to ask any vault.

What a vault can’t see past

A vault guards its own store. It can’t reach copies that live elsewhere: the original in your camera roll, a photo you sent in a chat, or a screenshot. Moving the photo in is only half the job. The other half is removing those copies, which How to move photos into a vault app walks through.

Where Sealed helps, and where it doesn’t

It helps because its store, key and gate are all real. Each file gets its own random 256-bit key, and that key is sealed with your vault key. Your vault key is kept in the iPhone Keychain, on this device only, and it can be read only while the phone is unlocked.

It helps because the key is not your passcode. Your vault key is a random 256-bit key. It is not made from your passcode.

It doesn’t remove the copies you already have. Until you delete them, the originals stay in Photos, outside the vault.

It doesn’t stop someone who knows your codes. With plain Face ID unlock on, someone who knows your iPhone passcode can open Sealed through the Face ID prompt. In iOS, an app that asks for owner authentication gets Face ID or Touch ID first, and the device passcode when biometry isn’t available or the person taps the fallback button.

It doesn’t have a way back if you lose your passcode and your recovery key. Because your key never reaches us, we cannot recover your vault or reset your passcode for you.

Questions and answers

Is my passcode used to encrypt my photos?

In some apps it is, in others it is only a lock on the door. In Sealed it is the second kind. Your vault key is a random 256-bit key. It is not made from your passcode. Your passcode is a gate in front of the app. It is not part of the key.

Can the company behind a vault app see my photos?

Only if it holds a key. Ask where the key lives and whether there is an account. Sealed has no account, so there is nothing to sign up for. Your vault key never reaches us.

What happens to the vault if I delete the app?

On the phone, the vault goes with the app unless a backup exists. If you delete Sealed from an iPhone while iCloud Backup is off, the vault on that iPhone is deleted with it. Deleting the app doesn’t delete your iCloud backup: Delete iCloud Backup in Settings does.

Sources

What this page says about Sealed was checked against the app on .

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Get Sealed

Sealed is free to download, and Sealed Pro is an optional in-app purchase.